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The prospect of long-term global and irreversible harm to
the environment by certain economic activities of our genera-
tion has brought environmental issues from the periphery to
the center of the international political agenda. Consequently,
the world has entered a new age of environmental diplomacy,
resulting in a rapid evolution of the international law of the
environment. The political awakening and rising level of public
concern over the state of our environment during the past few
decades have resulted in the adoption of a number of interna-
tional instruments designed to limit the harm to the environ-
ment from human activity. While most measures adopted in
the first few decades of the second half of this century concen-
trated primarily on end-of-pipe solutions, many measures
adopted in the recent past have sought to identify and arrest
the environmental problems before they occur. In accordance
with this precautionary approach, which demands that atten-
tion be paid to the sources of the problem, states started ex-
ploring various possibilities of creating economic incentives for
various industries to produce environmentally less damaging
products rather than imposing the will of the state on particu-
lar industries.
* LL.B., M.A. (Tribhuvan); LL.M. with Distinction (Hull); D.Phil. (Oxford);
Reader in International Law, Hull University Law School, England, and Visiting
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Although traditionally market forces have been perceived
as environmentally unfriendly actors, certain experiences have
demonstrated that well conceived economic incentives to indus-
try can play a significant role in programs for the protection of
the environment and the sustainable use and development of
the resources of the earth. Accordingly, it was as early as 1971
that Germany's national environmental plan put forward the
concept of eco-labels for consumer products.' The eco-labeling
program was launched in 1978 as the first program of its kind
in the world and has served since then as a model for all other
efforts of similar character of other countries.2 Since then eco-
labeling programs-putting labels on products to inform con-
sumers of their environmentally-friendly character-have be-
come increasingly popular.
Currently, such environmental labeling schemes, which
can be described as "positive labeling programs," exist in ap-
proximately twenty-two countries.' In an effort to harmonize
the eco-labeling programs within the member countries of
certain organizations, joint measures have been undertaken to
adopt a unified system of granting such labels. Examples of
this include the decisions of the Nordic Council and the Euro-
pean Union on this matter. Thus, the labeling programs are
apparently becoming increasingly popular in many industrial-
ized countries as well as the fast-growing economies of the
world. The potential usefulness of labeling requirements aimed
at protecting the environment has been recognized by a grow-
ing number of states.' Indeed, Agenda 21 recognizes the sig-
nificance of eco-labeling schemes in these words: "Govern-
ments, in cooperation with industry and other relevant groups,
should encourage expansion of environmental labeling and
other environmentally related product information programs
designed to assist consumers to make informed choices."6
1. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 43 (1991) [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
2. See id.; Veena Jha et al., Eco-Labeling and International Trade: Prelim-
inary Information from Seven Countries, UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 70, 13
(1993).
3. There are a variety of environmental labels ranging from hazard warnings
on chemicals and pesticide packaging (which could be defined as "negative labeling
programs") to "recycled paper" self-claims on publications and stationery.
4. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
5. Because of space problems, only a few. selected cases of eco-labeling
schemes will briefly be surveyed in this Article.
6. AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993)
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INTERNATIONAL ECO-LABELS
The main objective of eco-labeling programs is to harness
market forces and channel them towards promoting more envi-
ronmentally friendly patterns of production. Since the labels
provide consumers with -an easily-recognizable symbol indicat-
ing that a product's environmental friendliness has been as-
sessed and approved by a credible body of experts, the label
should improve the sales or image of a labeled product. It is
hoped that by creating consumer awareness of less environ-
mentally damaging products and helping the so-called "green
consumers" to make informed purchasing decisions, labeling
schemes will eventually encourage manufacturers to change
their entire product development process into a more environ-
mentally friendly process.
However, this growth of national and regional organiza-
tional labeling programs, albeit voluntary, may raise interna-
tional concern because it may have repercussions on the exist-
ing international trading system based mainly on the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system.' While the
GATT system is designed to remove barriers to trade, the na-
tional and regional eco-labeling systems could be viewed by
other states as new non-tariff barriers to free trade. It is this
international legal and trade aspect of the eco-labeling system
that this Article examines.
Although present labeling programs are for the most part
voluntary, discrimination may result, particularly when em-
ploying the cradle-to-grave assessment method when foreign
goods are assessed by a national eco-label awarding body.
Therefore, it is necessary to briefly examine the existing major
labeling schemes before examining the international legal
aspects of such schemes. Other types of environmental label
(e.g., negative labeling that indicates a product's dangers or
hazardous properties) will not be discussed in this Article as
its aim is to examine international legal aspects of eco-labeling
at 38, para. 4.21.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, art. X.1
(1994) (GATT 1947 was incorporated into the WTO as GATT 1994 in Annex IA to
the WTO Agreement) [hereinafter GATT].
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schemes that are designed to base the award of a label on a
life-cycle analysis of a product.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING EcO-LABELING PROGRAMS8
As stated earlier, the first environmental label was issued
in Germany in 1978.' By 1991 the program had 3,600 labeled
products in 64 product categories.'" A similar program was
launched in Canada in 1988 and in Japan in 1989." Under a
harmonized Nordic Council Program, Norway, Sweden, and
Finland began their labeling scheme in 1991." They were fol-
lowed in the same year by Austria, Portugal, and France.
13
The European Union launched its unified scheme in 1992
when it adopted a Community Regulation authorizing national
bodies within the Member Countries to issue eco-labels under
the general supervision of Brussels. 4 Programs are currently
under consideration in certain other OECD countries. Among
developing countries, India, 5 the Republic of Korea, and Sin-
gapore have already launched their eco-labeling programs
while Brazil, Colombia, Malaysia, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are exploring the possibility
8. See generally PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL GOVERNANCE 26-28 (1990); OECD REPORT, supra note 1; Owen McIntyre, En-
vironmental Labelling--Clean Conscience for the Consumer or a Missed Opportu-
nity?, 1994 J. BUS. L. 270, 273-76; Christian Tietje, Voluntary Eco-Labelling Pro-
grams and Questions of State Responsibility in the WTOIGATT Legal System, 29
J. WORLD TRADE 123, 127-28 (1995).
9. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
10. See id. at 13.
11. See id. at 49-53.
12. See id. at 13.
13. See id.
14. Council Regulation 880/92, 1992 O.J. (L 99) 1 [hereinafter EC Council
Regulation].
15. Under the Indian eco-labeling program an "Eco-mark" label is to be
awarded by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) to products meeting national
environmental and pollution control standards. A non-phosphate laundry detergent
became the first product to receive the "Eco-mark" from the BIS in March, 1994.
The Bureau seems to have worked out the criteria and standards for awarding the
"Eco-mark" label to 16 different groups of products. See A Consumer-Friendlier
Country, WORLD CONSUMER, Mar. 13, 1994, at 7. See also M. van Amelrooy, Indi-
an Environmental Policy and the Use of Economic Instruments, in THE INDO-
DUTCH PROGRAM ON ALTERNATIVES IN DEVELOPMENT, OCCASIONAL PAPERS AND RE-
PRINTS 1 (1994). See generally Vinod Rege, GATT Law and Environment-Related




of developing eco-labeling systems."
Under all programs currently existing or proposed, there
are committees with broad representation-with members from
the government department concerned, as well as consumer,
environmental, and industry interests-that determine or
suggest to a government minister which product categories are
eligible for labeling. Within each category the scope of products
is defined, and the threshold criteria a product must meet is
established with the help of experts.
Domestic or foreign manufacturers may, if they so wish,
submit products for consideration. If the product meets the
criteria of the product category, a label can be obtained and
used when marketing the product, in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the contract concluded with the com-
mittee or administering body. Since the German scheme is the
oldest and perhaps the most developed scheme of all eco-label-
ing programs, a close examination of this scheme and of the
relatively recent attempt of the EC to harmonize the eco-label-
ing program within the EC would help to understand how the
labeling schemes operate.
A. The German "Blue Angel" Program
The German eco-labeling scheme is a voluntary, govern-
ment-sponsored scheme that works with the private sector and
non-governmental organizations. 7 Anyone may propose a
product category for the award of a German eco-label-a "Blue
Angel" label. 8 Once the application is submitted for the
award of the label, three bodies are involved in the process of
granting the award: (i) the Federal Environment Agency (FEA)
16. See generally Rege, supra note 15, at 135 tbl.5.
17. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 43, 48; A-Z OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION IN GERMANY 52-54, 122-124 (Informationszentrum Umwelt 1992) (1988).
18. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 45. The "Blue Angel" is the official
emblem of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), although pursuant
to correspondence dating back to 1978, the UNEP Secretariat authorized its use
for the German eco-labeling scheme. In 1991, UNEP unsuccessfully tried to obtain
protection of the emblem under Article 6 ter of the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property (refused on the grounds that UNEP is "not an inde-
pendent intergovernmental organization"). Information about this correspondence
was kindly supplied to the author by Professor Dr. Peter H. Sand, Director of the
English Section of the 1994 Session of the Center for Studies and Research in
International Law and International Relations of The Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law (on file with author).
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(it is a governmental environmental protection authority); (ii)
the eleven-member non-governmental Environmental Label
Jury (ELJ) (it includes representatives from environmental
and science organizations, consumer associations, industry,
trade unions, and the media); and (iii) the non-profit scientific
organization Institute for Quality Assurance and Labeling
(RAL) whose members are 140 private-sector associations.
The awarding of the German Blue Angel label is a four-
stage process. First, the FEA reviews proposals for product
categories and passes them to the ELJ, which then determines
which ones warrant further investigation. These then become
the subjects of a cradle-to-grave analysis by the FEA, whereby
important environmental impacts are assessed in each stage of
a product's life.
The second stage involves the life-cycle reports prepared
by the FEA, which in turn go to the RAL for an expert hearing
to establish the threshold criteria. When the life-cycle report
and the threshold criteria are sent back to the ELJ, the third
stage involves review by the ELJ of the reports of the FEA and
the RAL. It is then up to the EUJ to accept, amend, or reject
the reports for the award of the Blue Angel label to the prod-
uct as an environmentally-friendly product within a product
category. The fourth stage involves the supervision by the RAL
of the awarding and signing of contracts with manufacturers.
Germany uses the Blue Angel symbol of the United Na-
tions Environment Program (UNEP) as its eco-label together
with the word "Umweltzeichen" ("environmental label") above
the explanatory phrase "weil. . . " ("because. . . ") below, and
the words "Jury Umweltzeichen."19 The idea behind this Ger-
man initiative was to reduce pollution in the environment by
encouraging industry to produce environmentally-friendly
consumer products through technological innovation; since the
program would help provide more accurate information in
guiding consumer choices, the "green" consumer would opt for
19. When the program was launched in 1978 the word "Umweltfreundlich"
("environmentally-friendly') was used rather than the word "Umweltzeichen." How-
ever, when the goods produced in Germany and abroad began to enter the market
in the 1980s with the self-proclaimed words "environment-friendly" and "ozone-
friendly," the word "Umweltfreundlich" was replaced by the word "Umweltzeichen"




environmentally-friendly products even if it meant paying a
higher price for such products.
B. The EC Eco-Label Award Scheme
With a view to harmonizing the environmental labeling
efforts underway in several EC countries, the Council of the
EC introduced, through the adoption of Council Regulation
880/92 of March 23, 1992, a Europe-wide Eco-Label Award
Scheme." The scheme is in keeping with the Fifth Environ-
ment Action Program of the EC, which stresses the importance
of subsidiaries and of market based instruments.2
The Eco-Label Award Scheme has been hailed as a good
example of both these approaches. The EC eco-label, the offi-
cial logo of the EC-a flower with the letter "e" and
Community's star symbolism22-is to be awarded to products
that have a reduced impact on the environment.23 The task of
defining a product group and establishing ecological criteria for
that product group is perhaps the most important aspect of
any eco-labeling program because it is these criteria that a
product must meet to qualify for an eco-label.24 Therefore, it
is during the development of ecological criteria for a product
group that the EC Commission works in close co-operation
with the Member States.'
A national body begins the process by preparing a report
on the definition of product groups and the criteria to be ap-
plied to a product within the product group.26 The national
body does so in consultation with the various national interest
groups and submits it to the Commission." In turn, the Com-
mission seeks the opinion of the Consultation Forum composed
of representatives from industry and trade as well as consumer
and environmental organizations.28 After this consultation,
20. EC Council Regulation, supra note 14.
21. See id.; Commission Decision 93/326/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 129) 23; Commis-
sion Decision 93/430/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 198) 35; Commission Decision 93/431/EEC,
1993 O.J. (L 198) 38; Commission Decision 93/517/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 243) 13.
22. See EC Council Regulation, supra note 14, Annex II.
23. See id. art. 1.
24. See id. art. 5.
25. See id. arts. 6, 7.
26. See id. arts. 5-10.
27. See id. art. 6.
28. See EC Council Regulation, supra note 14, Annex II, art. 6.
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the Commission presents its proposal to the Regulatory Com-
mittee composed of representatives from Member States.29
Once Community agreement is reached on the definition of
the product group and the criteria for a product, the Commis-
sion formally adopts the criteria and publishes them in the
Official Journal."° The establishment of ecological criteria ap-
plicable to each product is based on the study of the entire life
cycle of the product.3 In other words, it involves examining in
detail the cradle-to-grave aspects of the raw materials used,
manufacturing process, distribution, end use, and final dispos-
al.3
2
Manufacturers or importers may make an application to
the competent body in the Member country where the product
is manufactured or imported from a non-EC country.33 When
the national body decides that the EC eco-label can be awarded
to the product because it meets the criteria of the Community
level, it must, nevertheless, inform the Commission of its deci-
sion.34 The Commission then passes on the decision to other
national bodies who can register their objection to the decision
within 30 days. 5 If no objection is registered, the label can be
awarded and used in all Member States.36 If objections are
raised, the decision will have to be explored again at Commu-
nity level.3
7
Like the German scheme, the EC scheme is also voluntary
and open to both EC and non-EC manufacturers. 3' What is
important about this scheme is that once approved by one
Community Member State, it can be used throughout the other
14 states (perhaps more states in the near future because of
the ongoing enlargement of the EU) without having to file a
separate application in every country.39
29. See id. art. 7.
30. See id. art. 14(a).
31. See id. art. 3(d).
32. See id. art. 5(4).
33. See id. art. 10(1).
34. See EC Council Regulation, supra note 14, Annex II, art. 10(3).
35. See id. art. 10(3)(4).
36. See id. art. 10(4).
37. See id.





Although the Canadian program is largely based on the
German scheme, the former is different in certain respects
from the latter in that the organization which is responsible
for handling the whole project-Environmental Choice-is a
governmental organization. It is administered by a Secretariat
on behalf of an independent Advisory Board, consisting of 16
members appointed by the Environment Minister among which
include representatives from environmental, industry, and
consumer groups. The Environmental Choice logo is "a maple
leaf representing Canada's environment, composed of three
doves, symbolizing the three major partners joining to protect
the environment: government, industry and commerce."'
Japan launched its eco-labeling program in 1989 as a
quasi-governmental project called the "Project for the Promo-
tion of the Ecologically Safe Merchandise," better known as the
Eco-Mark program.4 "The Eco-Mark symbol is two arms em-
bracing the world, symbolizing the protection of the earth with
our own hands. The arms spell out the letter 'e,' which stands
for 'environment,' 'earth,' and 'ecology."'42
The Nordic Council's eco-labeling program began in 1989
when the ministers from the five Nordic countries, namely,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden agreed to
introduce a harmonized Nordic environmental label.3 The
symbol of the Nordic label is a white swan in a green back-
ground with the words "environmentally-labeled" above in
Swedish, Norwegian, or Finnish languages. The Nordic scheme
is similar to the EC scheme; in fact, the former could have
provided a model for the latter.
The situation in the United States is different altogether.
No legislative measures have been adopted on this matter at
the federal level. Although the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has published federal procurement guidelines on
40. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 49. See also Door Open for Ecologo Appli-
cations, EcoLo-o (Environmental Choice, Toronto, Ont.), Aug. 1989, at 1 (offering
a picture of the logo).
41. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53.
42. Id. See also "Eco Mark" Design Decided on, "Eco Mark" Project to Be Im-
plemented, JAPAN ENVTL. SUMMARY, Mar. 10, 1989, at 1, 2 (offering a picture of
the symbol).
43. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 59; SAND, supra note 8, at 26.
1999]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
certain materials with recycled content, these guidelines are
not binding.' However, much legislation has been adopted at
the state level to regulate certain labeling activities." A great
deal of such activity also takes place in the private sector.46
"The Green Cross Certification Company is a non-profit
division of Scientific Certifications Systems Inc., a food and
products testing company," which verifies environmental
claims by manufacturers and issues Green Cross labels.47
There is another program called the Green Seal, also operating
as a private environmental labeling body, which uses environ-
mental criteria based on the entire life-cycle of each product."
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EcO-LABELS
A. Trade Implications
First, it should be made clear that eco-labeling programs
differ significantly from traditional government instruments
that might be regarded as trade barriers. Hence, it has been a
generally perceived view49 that current environmental label-
ing programs, which are voluntary, do not presently pose seri-
ous trade implications.50 Second, labeling programs are by
their nature discriminatory because the goal is to select only
those products that have significantly less environmental im-
pact compared with other products in their category. This is
the only way that labeling programs can identify more environ-
mentally friendly products in any given category.
Nevertheless, the trade impact of ever-growing environ-
mental labeling programs will depend substantially on how the
schemes are administered. As stated in the 1991 OECD Report
on environmental labeling, "[blecause all existing labeling
programs seek to employ a cradle-to-grave perspective in es-
44. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 68. See generally Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing
Monster: National Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 303 (1993).
47. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 68.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Report by the Chairman of the Group on Environmental Mea-
sures and International Trade presented to the Contracting Parties at their Forty-
ninth Session, Feb. 2, 1994, GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 88 (1995) [hereinafter




tablishing criteria... one could imagine national discrimina-
tion as a result of criteria calling for differing production meth-
ods, cultivation practices, or raw material use."5 "For exam-
ple," the Report continues, "out of concern for tropical defores-
tation, product criteria might require that the wood in a prod-
uct be selected from timber grown in a sustainable manner."
52
This is what Austria actually did in 1992 through federal legis-
lation.3 Austria was later forced to amend the federal law
when Indonesia and Malaysia threatened legal action before
the GATT panel." Moreover, international trade could be ad-
versely affected by the environmental labeling programs to the
extent that imported products do not have access to national
schemes on the same terms as domestically produced goods.
Another concern raised in this context is that when the
eco-labeling programs grow, trade effects not inherent to the
environmental purpose of the scheme can arise, particularly for
small foreign suppliers and those from developing countries.
For instance, under certain labeling schemes the administra-
tors of the scheme visit the manufacturing plant before a label
is granted to ensure that the plant is in compliance with envi-
ronmental standards relevant to the product category.55
It will be difficult for many manufacturers in developing
countries to meet the costs of such inspection procedures as
most labeling schemes in OECD countries require the appli-
cant manufacturer to pay the cost involved in processing the
application. Further, since the eco-labeling schemes also
charge fees for the application,56 the annual contract, and
sometimes label publicity, all such expenses might prove too
burdensome for small and foreign firms. These expenses could
be interpreted as administrative trade barriers.
Similarly, the life-cycle analysis perspective of a national
labeling scheme may have trade implications on foreign states,
and especially on developing countries, as they might use pro-
cess and production methods that are judged environmentally
unsound in developed eco-label awarding countries. Not the
51. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
52. Id.
53. See infra Part III.B.2.
54. See id.
55. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
56. See EC Council Regulation, supra note 14, art. 11.
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unwillingness on the part of foreign manufacturers to produce
more environmentally-friendly products, but mere absence of
such capacity both in terms of capital and know-how could be
behind the production of environmentally unsound products.
The question as to whether certain processes and production
methods are, or are not, environmentally sound would depend
on how a national label awarding body defines the criteria for
a product to be eligible for a label. If the national body makes
such decisions under the influence of domestic environmental
standards, it may run the risk of imposing domestic values and
standards on exporting countries, raising the international
trade issue of "extraterritoriality."
Another problem is that a labeling program could be
viewed as a trade barrier if it involves requirements that put
small and foreign producers at a disadvantage because of the
costs involved or other reasons. Every eco-labeling program,
even voluntary ones, would have to be consistent with the
provisions of Articles 2 to 7 of the 1994 Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade 7 (TBT), including the Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Stan-
dards." Article 2.1 of the Agreement requires that Member
States must "ensure that in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in
any other country."59
Similarly, Article 2.2 requires all contracting parties to
"ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade." 9 Although under this
provision of the TBT Agreement, states can adopt technical
regulations necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, which
includes the environment, "such technical regulations [must]
57. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 2-7,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 138 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter TBT].
58. Id. Annex III.
59. Id. art. 2.1.
60. Id. art. 2.2.
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not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill such a
legitimate objective."6
Article 2.9 provides that when a Member State adopts a
technical regulation with regard to a product, and the regula-
tion has a significant effect on the trade of other Member
States, it must fulfill a number of requirements stipulated in
the Agreement.62 For instance, the State concerned must pub-
lish a notice in a publication to this effect at an appropriate
stage, early enough to allow reasonable time for other contract-
ing parties to make comments in writing and take these com-
ments into account.6"
Therefore, the Member State concerned would have to
ensure that effective access to labeling schemes is granted to
overseas suppliers. This would provide them with an opportu-
nity to participate in the selection process of a product's cate-
gory for consideration of labeling as well as establishing the
criteria and threshold levels that such products must meet to
qualify for a label.
Moreover, to avoid undermining the provisions of the
GATT Article X.1" and reduce the adverse impact of eco-la-
beling on third countries, it would be necessary to increase the
transparency of eco-labeling programs, including the details of
the product categories covered, their criteria, and threshold
levels.
These are just certain examples of possible trade implica-
tions of the current and future eco-labeling programs. Howev-
er, such impacts will depend, by and large, upon the practice of
national labeling authorities when selecting product categories
for labeling and determining the environmental criteria that
the products must meet to be eligible to use the label. The
selection process may favor product attributes that can more
easily be met by domestic manufacturers, or take into account
local environmental resource constraints and local preferences
for specific attributes of products which may ultimately put
foreign products at a disadvantage.
61. Id.
62. Id. art. 2.9.
63. See id. arts. 2.9.1, 2.9.4.
64. GATT, supra note 7, art. X.1.
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B. The GATT Rules and Eco-Labels
1. The GATT Implications
If eco-labeling programs have trade implications, they are
also likely to have the GATT implications. That is not to say
that such programs would necessarily be inconsistent with the
GATT rules. The fundamental principles of national treatment
and non-discrimination of the GATT require every contracting
party to accord to foreign products "treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use."" If foreign products cannot achieve the criteria
set by a national label awarding body for reasons explained in
the preceding section, labeling programs could run the risk of
violating the above provision of the GATT. However, as pointed
out in the 1991 OECD Report on environmental labeling, "it is
difficult to view this as discrimination on the basis of national
origin, per se.""6 The argument runs thus: under the existing
eco-labeling programs a product may not be denied an eco-label
because of its geographic or national origin, but because it did
not meet the criteria set for the product category.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that such market-based in-
struments may result in trade effects distinct from their envi-
ronmental objectives, altering the competitive position of small
and foreign manufacturers. Of course, the GATT does not pre-
vent countries from following environmental policies such as
eco-labeling, provided that such policies do not constitute hid-
den barriers to trade. At the same time, it is also doubtful
whether the GATT permits eco-labeling programs by individual
contracting parties.
The main principles of the GATT are enshrined in Articles
I (most favored nation treatment) and III (national treat-
ment).67 These provisions ensure that international trade be-
tween the contracting parties does not suffer from any discrim-
inatory practices of any contracting state against the product
of another state that is a party to the GATT. However, Article
XX provides for certain general exceptions under which a con-
65. Id. art. III.4.
66. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
67. GATT, supra note 7, arts. I, III.
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tracting party may derogate from its obligations undertaken
under the GATT:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."
In the Tuna/Dolphin I case,69 the GATT Panel held that
the GATT allows, under certain conditions, eco-labeling-i.e.,
measures by individual states permitting or requiring labels
referring to environmental aspects of production and process
methods-provided that such schemes do not undermine the
main principles of the GATT.70 The Panel also held that the
primary aim of any environmental measures that affect trade
should be to protect the environment rather than the domestic
market." Accordingly, the GATT Panel found that provisions
of the U.S. legislation on Tuna/Dolphin were not only intended
to protect the species but were also intended to protect the
U.S. fishing industry.7" Thus, the U.S. law violated the GATT
Article III because it discriminated between the imported prod-
uct and the like domestic product. It could not be defended
under exceptions in the GATT Article XX because, in the
Panel's view, the exceptions applied only to measures with
68. Id. art. XX.
69. GATT Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 205, para. 7.3 (1993) [hereinafter
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna].
70. Id. at 205.
71. Id. at 200, para. 5.31.
72. Id. at 200-01, paras. 5.32-5.33.
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internal or domestic objectives." The Panel held that:
a contracting party is free to tax or regulate imported prod-
ucts and like domestic products as long as its taxes or regula-
tions do not discriminate against imported products or afford
protection to domestic producers, and a contracting party is
also free to tax or regulate domestic production for environ-
mental purposes. As a corollary to these rights, a contracting
party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different
from its own. 4
The Panel explained that if individual states were to be
allowed to impose their national environmental standards on
other states allegedly under the exceptions provided for in
Article XX of the GATT that:
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or
health protection policies from which other contracting par-
ties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under
the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then
no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade
among all contracting parties but would provide legal securi-
ty only in respect of trade between a limited number of con-
tracting parties with identical internal regulations."
A similar view was taken by the second tuna panel of the
GATT that examined the measures taken by the U.S. prohibit-
ing imports of tuna harvested through methods that killed
dolphins."6 Under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) of 1972, no country, whether primary or intermediary,
was allowed to export tuna products to the U.S. unless they
certified that they did not import tuna from countries which
harvested tuna through methods that killed dolphins." The
EC and the Netherlands (on behalf of the Netherlands Antil-
les) lodged a complaint against this measure of the United
States."8 The issue before the Panel was not the competence
73. Id. at 194-95, paras. 5.11, 5.12, 5.14.
74. Id. at 204, para. 6.2.
75. Id. at 199, para. 5.27.
76. See GATT Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, May 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 [hereinafter Panel Report].
77. Id. at 846-50, paras. 2.5-2.15
78. Id. at 844.
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of the United States to take environmental measures to protect
dolphins, but the propriety of the U.S. trade embargoes on the
import of tuna products from other countries designed to se-
cure changes in the policies that other members of the GATT
pursued within their own territories.
The Panel held that the measures included in the U.S.
MMPA were inconsistent with the obligations of the U.S. un-
dertaken under the GATT.79 The Panel declared that the U.S.
measures were not covered by exceptions in Article XX of the
GATT."0 The Panel stated that:
Article XX provides for an exception to obligations under the
General Agreement. The long-standing practice of panels has
accordingly been to interpret this provision narrowly, in a
manner that preserves the basic objectives and principles of
the General Agreement. If Article XX were interpreted to
permit contracting parties to deviate from the obligations of
the General Agreement by taking trade measures to imple-
ment policies, including conservation policies, within their
own jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the General Agree-
ment would be maintained. If however Article XX were inter-
preted to permit contracting parties to take trade measures
so as to force other contracting parties to change their poli-
cies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation
policies, the balance of rights and obligations among contract-
ing parties, in particular the right of access to markets,
would be seriously impaired. Under such an interpretation
the General Agreement could no longer serve as a multilater-
al framework for trade among contracting parties.81
It is not that the GATT Panel rejected the validity of the envi-
ronmental objectives of the United States to protect and con-
serve dolphins. Instead the Panel found that such environmen-
tal objectives had to be achieved without undermining the
obligations of the United States under the GATT. Specifically,
the Panel stated that:
[T]he objective of sustainable development, which includes
the protection and preservation of the environment, has been
widely recognized by the contracting parties to the General
79. Id. at 899, para. 6.1.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 894, para. 5.26 (footnote omitted).
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Agreement.... [T]he issue in this dispute was not the valid-
ity of the environmental objectives of the United States to
protect and conserve dolphins. The issue was whether, in the
pursuit of its environmental objectives, the United States
could impose trade embargoes to secure changes in the poli-
cies which other contracting parties pursued within their own
jurisdiction. The Panel therefore had to resolve whether the
contracting parties, by agreeing to give each other in Article
XX the right to take trade measures necessary to protect the
health and life of plants, animals and persons or aimed at
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, had agreed
to accord each other the right to impose trade embargoes for
such purposes. The Panel had examined this issue in the
light of the recognized methods of interpretation and had
found that none of them lent any support to the view that
such an agreement was reflected in Article XX. 2
This indicates that while a state's ability to conserve its
own natural resources is unfettered by the GATT, the ability of
such a state to take environmental measures to conserve re-
sources outside its borders is doubtful. The Austrian federal
legislation of 1992 on the labeling of tropical timber and tim-
ber products is an illuminating example.83 The timber certifi-
cation scheme is different from the eco-labeling scheme since
timber certification deals with the origin of timber and timber
products and not with life-cycle analysis of all timber and tim-
ber products. But the Austrian initiative is relevant to this
study as it raises certain interesting legal questions concerning
the compatibility of national environmental measures with the
GATT rules.
2. The Austrian Experience
In the height of growing public concern within and outside
Austria over the destruction of tropical forests and the global
long-term impact on the change of world climate, the Austrian
parliament adopted legislation in 1992" with the aim of stop-
82. Panel Report, supra note 76, at 898, para. 5.42.
83. See Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann, Austrian Legislative Efforts to Regulate
Trade in Tropical Timber and Timber Products, 46 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L.
283, 284 (1994).
84. See id. See also Brian F. Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The
Legality of Unilateral Attempts to Promote Sustainable Development Under the
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ping all imports of tropical timber and tropical timber products
from areas that were not sustainably managed.85 What is sig-
nificant about this federal law is that it provides for mandato-
ry labeling of tropical timber and tropical timber products
being placed on the market with a quality mark, written
"made of tropical timber" or "containing tropical timber" and
imposes a 70% import tariff on all tropical timber and tropical
timber products.86
Permission to carry this quality mark was to be issued by
the Austrian Federal Ministry for Environment upon applica-
tion, provided that the applicant could prove that the tropical
timber and the tropical timber products met the criteria set by
the federal law.87 That is to say that the tropical timber or
the tropical timber product had to be exclusively from
sustainably managed forests. For the purposes of this law,
sustainable forest management meant, inter alia, economic and
ecologically sustainable exploitation of the raw material tim-
ber, diversified exploitation, reforestation in accordance with
the criteria of economic and ecologically sustainable exploita-
tion and preservation of all functions of the forest.88
Shortly after the law entered into force, the ASEAN coun-
tries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, expressed their con-
cern about the compatibility of the Austrian law with the obli-
gations of Austria under the GATT.89 The main arguments of
the ASEAN countries advanced through their communication
to the GATT Council was that the Austrian law was discrimi-
natory, unjustifiable, and an unnecessary obstacle to trade."
GATT, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 374 (1994).
85. Owing to the growing international concern for the preservation of tropical
forests a new International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) was concluded in
January 1994 at Geneva. This Agreement, which replaces the earlier (1983) ITTA,
is the first internationally binding instrument on tropical timber that emphasizes
sustainable management of tropical forests. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv.,
INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT 15 (U.N. Doc. TD/Timber.2/16, U.N.
Sales No. E.94.II.D.23) (1994). See also Karl G. van Orsdol & Jean-Pierre Kiekens,
Environmental Labeling: A Market Based Solution for Promoting Sustainable For-
estry Management in the Tropics, in CONSERVATION OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRI-
CAN RAINFORESTS 279, 280 (1992); Sucharipa-Behrmann, supra note 83, at 284.
86. See Sucharipa-Behrman, supra note 83, at 284-86; Chase, supra note 84,
at 375-76.
87. See Sucharipa-Behrmann, supra note 83, at 286.
88. See id. at 285-86.
89. See id. at 287.
90. See id. at 277-78. See also Chase, supra note 84, at 376-78.
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The ASEAN countries complained that the law did not require
mandatory labeling of other types of wood and wood products
imported into Austria or produced domestically." Therefore,
they argued, Austria was not honoring its obligations under
the GATT, especially those relating to the most-favored-nation
treatment and the national treatment.92 They also challenged
the Austrian decision to levy a 70% import tariff on tropical
timber and tropical timber products. 3
Defending its law, Austria stated "that its move was not
induced by any economic or protective motivation but by strict-
ly environmental" concerns. 4 Austria argued that the labeling
requirement did not constitute an obstacle to trade since prod-
uct labeling per se was not a trade restriction, and the law did
not impose any quantitative or qualitative restrictions on im-
ports from any destination.95 One of the interesting argu-
ments advanced by Austria was that the law was not discrimi-
natory in nature since it applied to any tropical timber or trop-
ical timber product, including its own tropical timber products
(it should be noted that this country has no tropical forest),
irrespective of the country of export or origin. Austria also
rejected the allegations of extra-territorial action since the law
applied exclusively to the Austrian territory."
However, faced with criticism from tropical timber export-
ing countries and the likelihood of losing the case if it were to
be referred to the GATT Panel, Austria amended its law and
abolished the mandatory labeling requirement for tropical
timber and tropical timber products as well as the 70% import
tariff.98 Under the amended law the labeling requirement is
91. It should be noted that Article XX(g) of the GATT requires that any mea-
sure adopted by a contracting party must be "made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT, supra note 7, art.
XX(g). Here, the question may arise as to what corresponding domestic measure is
Austria supposed to take since it has no tropical forest? The tropical countries
would say that Austria should subject all timber and timber products to the same
rules as those applied to tropical timber and tropical timber products. If Austria
did so, it would not be accused of taking discriminatory measures.
92. See Sucharipa-Behrmann, supra note 83, at 287.
93. See id. at 285.
94. Id. at 288.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 289.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 290.
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(like any other eco-labeling program) voluntary, and the quali-
ty mark can now be issued to all kinds of timber and timber
products from sustainably managed forests.99 Analysts have
stated that if the Austrian move had subjected all kinds of
timber from unsustainably managed areas to the regime intro-
duced and had levied a much lower tariff on all timber im-
ports, it would have been a successful pioneering move rather
than a counter-productive exercise as the amendment to the
original federal law strengthened the arguments advanced by
the ASEAN countries. By introducing a much lower import
tariff on all timber and timber products from unsustainably
managed areas, Austria would have been in a position to help
internalize environmental and social costs and increase export
revenues in countries implementing sustainable forestry tech-
niques.
09
C. Unresolved Legal Issues
If Austria had not amended the law and the ASEAN coun-
tries had taken the dispute before the GATT Panel, we' would
have witnessed a very interesting development. The Panel
would have been left with two questions to answer: (i) was the
Austrian law in violation of Article I and/or Article III of the
GATT; and (ii) if the answer was in the affirmative, could the
law still be defended under the general exceptions provided for
in Article XX of the GATT? Since such an opportunity was
aborted by the amendment to the Austrian law, these two
questions remain unresolved.
The answer to the first question depends on how the term
"like product" in Articles I and III of the GATT is defined.
Article I(1) requires every contracting party to accord immedi-
ately and unconditionally the most-favored-nation treatment
accorded to any product originating or destined for any other
country "to the like product" originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties. Similarly, Article
111(4) requires every contracting party to accord treatment to
the products of the territory of any contracting party similar to
those accorded "to like products" of national origin.
The answer, therefore, depends on whether or not all
99. See id. at 290-91.
100. See Chase, supra note 84, at 374.
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kinds of timber can be regarded as "like products" in the sense
of the GATT. Austria argued that since tropical timber and
other timber were not "like products," the original Austrian
law was not discriminatory in nature since it applied to all
tropical timber or tropical timber products regardless of the
country of origin. If all timber and timber products are consid-
ered "like products," the original Austrian law was perhaps in
violation of the GATT. But if tropical timber and tropical tim-
ber products are to be considered as different products from
other kinds of timber and timber products, the original Austri-
an law was not in violation of the GATT.'0 '
With regard to the answer to the second question, it is, of
course, possible for a state to take measures derogating from
its obligations under the GATT, provided that such measures
do not result in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
between products from other contracting parties themselves or
between domestic products and products from such coun-
tries. 2 The general exceptions contained in Article XX(b)
and (g) permit exceptions from the GATT obligations for mea-
sures that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health" or which relate "to the conservation of exhaust-
ible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption." °3
Therefore, it is doubtful whether the unilateral measures
regarding the protection of tropical forests by a non-tropical
country (Austria) were "necessary" in the sense of Article
XX104 Since the original Austrian legislation did not require
mandatory labeling for other kinds of timber and timber prod-
ucts imported from other contracting parties or produced do-
mestically, it could be argued that the Austrian law was not in
101. According to Chase, since temperate softwood and tropical hardwood logs
directly compete in the plywood, construction, and furniture industries, tropical
and non-tropical timber are considered to be "like products" in a number of differ-
ent industries worldwide. Id. at 383.
102. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in
GATT Article XX, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991).
103. Id. at 38.
104. Chase maintains that "at least tentatively, mandatory labeling laws as
applied to tropical timber appear to be prohibited under the GATT because they
unjustifiably discriminate between 'like' timber products under the 'soft' MFN and
NTO [national treatment obligation] requirements contained in the preamble of
Article XX." Chase, supra note 84, at 386.
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accordance with Article XX either.
Austria is not alone in taking measures designed to pro-
tect tropical rainforests. Among the countries that have taken
certain steps in this direction, the initiative of the Netherlands
is of significance for the purposes of this study and will be
reviewed next.
D. The Dutch Initiative to Protect Tropical Rainforests
The Government of the Netherlands, through a policy
paper on tropical rainforests in 1992, adopted a policy that
from 1995 onward, the use of tropical timber should be limited
to timber from countries or regions with a forest management
system geared to protection and sustainable production."5
This policy is arguably in compliance with the 1990 Bali meet-
ing of the International Tropical Timber Council (ITTC), which
states that by the year 2000 all tropical timber is to be derived
from sustainable logging practices.' 1 The intention of the
policy paper seems to be to use trade in tropical timber as an
instrument to promote sustainable forest management. With a
view to achieving this objective, the Dutch Government con-
cluded a Netherlands' Framework Agreement on Tropical Tim-
ber in June 1993 (Agreement) with various umbrella organiza-
tions of commercial entities, individual companies, and other
organizations involved in trade in tropical timber as well as in
the protection of tropical rainforests.0 7
The Agreement stated that "a properly functioning mar-
ket-oriented system to distinguish sustainably from non-
105. See THE NETHERLANDS' MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, INFORMAL WORKSHOP
ON TIMBER CERTIFICATION (1994).
106. See James Cameron & Farhana Yamin, Forests, 1 YB. INT'L ENV. L. 201-
202 (1990). See also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL
TIMBER AGREEMENT 14 (U.N. Doc. TDfiimber.2/16, U.N. Sales No. E.94.II.D23)
(1994). However, it should be noted that no international instrument defines what
constitutes sustainable logging of tropical timber.
107. A copy of the Agreement entitled, "Netherlands Framework Agreement on
Tropical Timber" was kindly supplied to the author by the Ministry of Environ-
ment of the Netherlands (on file with author) [hereinafter Framework Agreement].
For a brief report on this Agreement see 4 YB. INTL ENV. L. 265, 267 (1993). It
was signed on 25 June 1993 at The Hague by 12 parties, including Ministers from
various government Ministries, two environmental NGOs, and all national associa-
tions and trade unions engaged in some form of trade in tropical timber such as
the Netherlands Association of Timber Agents and the Netherlands Timber Trade
Association.
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sustainably produced timber can be an effective incentive to
promote sustainable forest management, since the costs of
sustainable production can be passed on to the consumer."' °
Under Article 2 of the Agreement, the Dutch Government and
other contracting parties undertook "to ensure that from 31
December 1995, the trading and processing of tropical timber
in the Netherlands shall be limited to timber supplied from
countries or regions with a forestry policy and management
system geared to protection and sustainable production." °9
The Agreement included a plan of action to prepare the
conditions necessary to achieve its objective, that all tropical
timber supplied on the Netherlands market from 1995 onwards
is sustainably produced."' Accordingly, it was proposed that
from 1997 onwards, tropical timber could be imported into the
Netherlands only after ascertaining that the timber came from
a sustainably managed forest, the origin of the tropical timber
has been established, and a certificate has been awarded. The
following targets were set in order to achieve these objectives
during the first phase of the action plan (i.e., the Development
and Exploration Phase, 1993):
1. A clear insight into the flow of tropical timber onto the
Dutch market, and the actors involved.
2. Agreement on the basic points of departure and methodolo-
gy to be used in more fully defining the concept of sustain-
able forest management and the means of testing this con-
cept for each producer country and/or forest management
unit.
3. A practical system for collecting, processing, analyzing and
supplying to each of the Parties relevant information needed
for the implementation of this Framework Agreement.
4. Insight into the modalities of a certification system and the
means of initiating its implementation.
108. Framework Agreement, supra note 107, at preamble, para. 8.
109. Id. art. 2. The deadline was since extended to December 31, 1996.
110. Id. art. 3.
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5. Insight into the demand in the Netherlands for sustainably
produced tropical timber.
6. Insight into the possibility or, as the case may be, the
modalities of legislation to restrict the trading, processing
and use of tropical timber in the Netherlands to timber sup-
plied from countries or regions with a forest policy and man-
agement structure aimed at protection and sustainable pro-
duction.'
Similarly, the targets set for the second phase (Experimental
Phase, 1994) were as follows:
1. A clear insight into the agreements concluded, and still to
be concluded, with the relevant authorities in producer coun-
tries which currently supply or could supply the Netherlands
with sustainably produced tropical timber.
2. An operational certification system and identification of
the actors involved.
3. An elaborated proposal for sustainable consumer informa-
tion activities designed to encourage demand in the Nether-
lands for tropical timber which has been awarded a certifi-
cate and to discourage demand for tropical timber that has
not been awarded a certificate.
Finally, the targets set for the third and last phase (Introduc-
tion Phase, 1995) were:
1. The exclusive supply of sustainably produced tropical tim-
ber on the Dutch market.
2. Wide familiarity with, and a positive attitude to, tropical
timber which has been awarded a certificate on the part of
the Dutch consumer.
3. Clarity regarding the activities to be pursued in the follow-
111. Id. art. 4.
112. Id. art. 5.
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up phase, i.e. following the expiry of this Framework Agree-
ment, or the way in which this Framework Agreement shall
be succeeded."'
However, in view of the GATT rules on non-discrimination, the
Dutch Government appears to have abandoned its plan for the
adoption of a new legislation to go ahead with its initial plan
on tropical timber and tropical timber products. It appears to
be another climbdown by yet another ambitious small Europe-
an power. Now the Dutch Government appears to seek support
for its loose voluntary labeling program from the business sec-
tor solely on the basis of persuasion rather than imposition.
The initial Dutch initiative differed from the Austrian
move in a number of ways. First, unlike the latter, the former
did not seek to ban the import of tropical timber products even
if they were from non-sustainably managed forests. Second, it
was not going to be the Government of the Netherlands that
sought to unilaterally impose a ban on tropical timber. Under
the Framework Agreement the Dutch Government undertook
to explore the possibility of concluding bilateral agreements
with tropical timber producing countries for bilateral co-opera-
tion in the field of sustainable forest management, trade in,
and processing of sustainably produced timber. Third, the
Dutch Government aimed to achieve the objectives stipulated
in the Agreement through co-operation with NGOs and compa-
nies involved in tropical timber trade rather than impose its
will on the importers of such timber. The signatories of the
Framework Agreement were simply required to purchase their
timber from those exporters and importers who have met the
requirements of the certification scheme.
Fourth, the ban envisaged on tropical timber from coun-
tries and regions from unsustainably managed forests was
supposed to come into effect on December 31, 1996."1 Howev-
er, the legislation required for the achievement of the objec-
tives of the Agreement has not been adopted and is unlikely to
be adopted. This may be one reason why no legal problem has
been raised concerning the compatibility of the envisaged mea-
sures with the GATT rules and other rules of international
law. Moreover, the Dutch government entered into negotiations
113. Id. art. 6.
114. Id. art. 2.
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with certain tropical timber producing countries to win their
support and to convince them of the desirability of this legisla-
tion, with a view perhaps to avoiding the Austrian situation in
which Austria had to repeal its law in the face of the opposi-
tion by certain tropical timber producing countries. One will
have to wait and see whether any state challenges the Dutch
measures designed to achieve the objectives of the 1993 Frame-
work Agreement when a voluntary labeling scheme is in place
on tropical timber from unsustainably managed forests.
Therefore, at this stage it is difficult to determine the legal
ramifications of the Dutch initiative. Nevertheless, since the
Dutch certification of the tropical timber system is largely a
voluntary one rather than a mandatory one and does not ex-
ceed the limits of the GATT exceptions it may not bring into
the spotlight similar legal issues as those raised by the Austri-
an move. However, since the Dutch initiative does not apply to
all timber the allegation of trade-discrimination against the
GATT rule may follow.
IV. SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING Eco-
LABELING
The discussions in the preceding paragraphs demonstrate
that the legal ramifications of eco-labeling programs are far
from clear. The impact of such economic measures on the world
trading system represented in the GATT merit a closer exami-
nation. Unfortunately, not much has been done in this direc-
tion at the inter-governmental level, although there exists
quite a substantial amount of literature on the subject.'15 A
GATT working group on trade and environment was estab-
lished as early as 1971."' However, its first meeting took
115. See generally Ralf Buckley, International Trade, Investment and Environ-
mental Regulation, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 101 (1993); Christopher Thomas & Greg A.
Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship Between Trade and Environmental Regula-
tion, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 23 (1993); Charnovitz, supra note 102, at 37-55; Eliza
Patterson, GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse Trade
and Environmental Effects, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 99 (1992); Jan Klabbers, Jurispru-
dence in International Trade Law: Article XX of GATT, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63
(1992); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Envi-
ronmental Law: Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes
in GATT, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 43 (1993).
116. See Charnovitz, supra note 102, at 37.
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place only in 1991, and it continued to work until 1993.117
Nevertheless, the objectives set by the group were somewhat
lopsided since it was concerned only with the effect of environ-
mental policy on trade, not vice versa.
When the Contracting Parties of the GATT gathered in
Marrakech, Morocco to conclude the new trade agreement in
April 1994, they established a Sub-Committee on Trade and
Environment to look into the trade aspects of environmental
measures." 8 Labeling was one of the topics that the Sub-
Committee was scheduled to discuss in its meeting beginning
September 12, 1994.119 One can hope that this Sub-Commit-
tee, which has become a Committee after the entry into force
of the instruments signed at Marrakech, will address the lacu-
nae that presently exist on the matter. Eco-labeling has contin-
ued to be one of the main items on the agenda of discussion of
the new WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment but
little progress has been made in adopting concrete mea-
sures.' Perhaps the time has come for a "Green Round" of
the GATT after the WTO Ministerial Conference in December
1996 in Singapore since the Singapore Conference did not do
much on this front. 2'
The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment submit-
ted a detailed report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference
outlining its work on various topics including eco-labeling."2 '
In its conclusions and recommendations the Committee stated
that "[w]ell-designed eco-labeling schemes/programs can be
effective instruments of environmental policy to encourage the
development of an environmentally-conscious consumer pub-
lic."'23 The Report continued:
117. See Report by the Chairman, supra note 49, at 75
118. See Sub-Committee on Trade and Environment Begins Work Programme,
TRADE AND ENV'T, July 26, 1994, at 2.
119. Id.
120. See Press Releases of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment,
Trade and the Environment, News and Views from the WTO, WTO Doc. Press/TE
010 (July 8, 1996), and Press/TE 013 (Sept. 27, 1996).
121. See The Conclusions of the 1st Ministerial Conference of the Members of
the WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, Dec.
13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218.
122. See The Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Trade
and the Environment, News and Views from the WTO, WTO Doc. Press/TE 014
(Nov. 18, 1996).
123. Id. at 131, para. 183.
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Increased transparency can help deal with trade concerns
regarding eco-labeling schemes/programs while it can also
help to meet environmental objectives by providing accurate
and comprehensive information to consumers. The CTE [the
Committee on Trade and Environment] felt that an impor-
tant starting point for WTO Members to address some of the
trade concerns raised over eco-labeling schemes/programs is
by discussing how to ensure adequate transparency in their
preparation, adoption and application, including affording
opportunities for participation in their preparation by inter-
ested parties from other countries. The transparency provi-
sions contained in the TBT [Technical Barriers to Trade]
Agreement, including the Code of Good Practice for standard-
izing bodies contained in Annex 3 of the Agreement provide a
reference point to the further work of the CTE in enhancing
transparency of eco-labeling schemes/programs.1"
As pointed out in the 1992 study by the GATT Secretariat
on Trade and Environment, the GATT places few limits on the
freedom of countries to apply non-discriminatory regulations to
protect their environment. With regard to the measures that
are discriminatory but at the same time necessary for the
protection of the environment, it may be a good idea to amend
Article XX by inserting a provision allowing a country to im-
pose measures relating to the protection of the environment,
both its own and that of the world at large or to negotiate a
new international Code or Agreement containing such provi-
sions." The agreements concluded at the end of the Uruguay
124. Id. at 31, para. 184.
125. See TBT, supra note 57, Annex III. Of course, there is the WTO Commit-
tee on Trade and the Environment to deliberate on such matters and come up
with proposals in this respect. However, the Committee can only recommend to
the WTO how this Organization could contribute to the protection and promotion
of the environment within the existing GATT/WTO legal framework. What is need-
ed is to take a fresh look at the GATT/WTO regime and consider adopting a pro-
tocol to the GATT to enable individual Member States to take national measures
designed to protect the environment in accordance with internationally approved
standards. Not much attention seems to have been paid during the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations to the impact of trade liberalization on the environ-
ment. Now, an informed and concerned public are questioning the merits of trade
liberalization and concerned about its potential conflict with the promotion of envi-
ronmental goals. What appears to be the future course of action for the interna-
tional community is to adopt a new international instrument which seeks to bal-
ance trade liberalization with its adverse impact on the environment.
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Round have in effect tried to ensure that voluntary standards
such as voluntary labeling programs aimed at the environment
do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.126 Although, as
mentioned earlier, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement includes
the environment as a legitimate objective for the achievement
of which states can adopt certain technical regulations and
standards,'27 such measures should not be more trade-restric-
tive than necessary to fulfil the objective. The overall and per-
haps overriding objective of the instruments adopted at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations seems
to be to limit trade restrictions to an absolute minimum. 28
With the proliferation of national eco-labeling programs, a
number of other transnational trade-related problems are like-
ly to arise. Environmentally-friendly products are likely to gain
an increasing share of not only domestic but also international
markets. For instance, German exports carrying the "Blue
Angel" are already quite popular among "green consumers" in
many EC countries. In this state of affairs, as stated by Sand,
"[t]o avoid unfair trade practices, arrangements for mutual
recognition of national environmental labels, possibly including
harmonized standards and procedures of product selection and
identification, will become necessary.
129
Indeed, as discussed earlier, the Nordic Council's harmo-
nized eco-labeling program encompasses five countries, and the
EC's harmonized program presently includes 15 countries with
a prospect of 20 in the near future." ° Both economic efficien-
cy and consumer confusion may warrant harmonization. Con-
sumer confusion may arise not only from several official and
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. This was also the position taken at the Rio World Conference on Environ-
ment and Development. For instance, Principle 12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development declares that:
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an in-
ternational consensus.
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in
AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1, 10 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993).
129. SAND, supra note 8, at 28.
130. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
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semi-official eco-labels but also from "ozone-friendly" non-sub-
stantive claims of manufacturers. Government sponsored eco-
labeling programs may help curb false advertising claims by
manufacturers to exploit "green consumers." Deceptive and
unsubstantiated claims such as labels carrying "environmen-
tally-friendly" or "ozone-friendly" words have appeared in
many products available in the market. Such claims confuse
consumers and dilute the significance of genuine attempts to
encourage consumers to buy more environmentally friendly
products.
In fact, owing to inflated claims by supermarket chains
and manufacturers for products that were often barely superior
to the traditional ones, the effectiveness of eco-labeling
schemes seems to have declined in many developed countries.
For instance, a report published in March 1996 by the Nation-
al Consumer Council of the U.K. concluded that claims for
many green products were "misleading, meaningless or even
downright dishonest, leaving consumers cynical and con-
fused."13' Consumers are unwilling to pay more for products
that perform badly even if they are claimed to be environmen-
tally friendly. It is quite understandable that people should
give up trying to buy more expensive "green" products alto-
gether since, as pointed out by the UK Consumer Council,
many of the "green" claims "are often woolly, meaningless,
unverifiable, open to multiple interpretations, confusing, or of
no real benefit."3 2 Indeed, a detergent product called "Daz
Ultra" sold by Proctor and Gamble in the UK, claiming to be
"biodegradable" was found to have exceeded EC standards on
biodegradability. Vague claims such as UK supermarket chain
Tesco's "Dolphin friendly" tuna fish or "softer on the environ-
ment" labeled toilet rolls are difficult claims to verify.
Another possibility of achieving harmonization would be
through the establishment of an international body empowered
to approve product groups and criteria. Like the EC and the
Nordic sysiem, the actual certification and awarding of labels
could take place at the national level. It could be a body like
the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO). Alterna-
131. See Paul Gosling, 'Green Consumers' Give Up Trying to Save the World,
INDEP., Apr. 21, 1996, at 1.
132. Id.
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tively, it should also be possible to entrust the WTO itself with
such powers through a protocol and establish a division within
this organization. An international agreement could be con-
cluded defining the criteria to be used in the life-cycle analysis
of a few selected products in every state party to such an
agreement.
However, as pointed out in the OECD report, one must not
overlook the possibility that "[gliven different composition of
product markets and the varying environmental concerns in
countries, the final product criteria established in a supra-
national system may be either too high or too low from a mem-
ber country's perspective."'33 Indeed, it is a matter that will
have to be judged in light of the practice of the EC countries in
the years to come.
Yet another suggested approach is the mutual recognition
of labels based on reciprocity. A state could automatically
award its national label to products that had been awarded a
label by another country and vice versa. This would not only
reduce confusion among consumers but also help minimize the
costs involved, especially for small and foreign manufacturers.
It should be emphasized that in order for such a rule based on
reciprocity to be effective it is desirable that the criteria be-
tween the two countries must be very similar. However, the
danger envisaged above with regard to a possible lowering of
standards under an international agreement would also apply
here. One way of safeguarding against such risk is to require
that every country should award labels to such products whose
quality is higher than normal environmental attributes among
similar products.
V. CONCLUSION
Labeling programs appear to hold promise as effective
nmarket-based tools for environmental protection, provided they
are supervised by a credible agency. Except for food products
and pharmaceuticals, for which there is a separate mechanism
for labeling, almost every product can be brought within the
voluntary eco-labeling program through economic incen-
tives."3 For instance, varnishes, coatings, gas burners, recy-
133. OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
134. One possible economic incentive could be lowering the VAT on eco-labeled
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cled paper-products, washing machines, dishwashers, batteries,
engine oil, plastic products, and household detergents are
among the products that have already been subjects for eco-
labeling in different countries.3 5
However, it should be noted that the role of such programs
can be a modest one as they are part of a broader environmen-
tal policy, and a labeled product may still harm the environ-
ment in one manner or another. All labeling schemes acknowl-
edge that a labeled product is only relatively more benign than
another in the same category. Modern-day consumers demand
industrial products, and these are likely to harm the environ-
ment. In light of this, labeling programs aim to capitalize on
the growing concern of consumers for the environment and
encourage them to pay more for genuinely environmentally-
friendly products. In short, eco-labeling programs, like most
environmental measures, can be described as a damage-limita-
tion exercise, which, of course, can function as a very useful
economic instrument for the protection and improvement of the
environment. However, this instrument can function effectively
if regulated properly by a credible national agency under a
harmonized national policy if it is a voluntary eco-labeling
program. If it is a mandatory national eco-labeling program
which is likely to affect other states, such a program should be
based on an international legal instrument such as an interna-
tionally binding code of conduct for eco-labeling.3 6
products.
135. See OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
136. This was actually the advice offered by the GATT Panel on the Tu-
na/Dolphin I case for states willing to use mandatory eco-labelling schemes having
effects on other states even if such schemes were designed to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health. See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
supra note 69, at 204, paras. 6.3, 6.4.
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